Friday, 3 June 2016

PRIME INSURANCE PLACED UNDER STATUTORY MANAGEMENT: WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

Sunduzwayo Madise
3rd June 2016
BACKGROUND
The Registrar of Financial Institutions has today issued a notification that Prime Insurance Company Limited (Prime) has been placed under statutory management. The notification advises the public:
       I.            Not to transact insurance business with any employee, agent or shareholder of Prime Insurance Company
    II.            During the period if statutory management, no new business or insurance policy renewals will be accepted by the Company
 III.            However, existing policies issued by the Company will remain valid.
Furthermore all Prime’s branches and agencies have been closed for business.
WHY THE CENTRAL BANK IS INVOLVED
According to law, the Governor of the Reserve Bank, is the Registrar of Financial Services.[1] That is why the two communiques in circulation today have been issued by Charles S R Chuka, the current Governor. So Charles Chuka essentially wears two hats; one of Governor of the central bank and one of Registrar of Financial Institutions. Both roles require of him to do specific duties, the common thread being that they are relate to the financial sector. But they are different roles.
In Malaŵi the overarching law that regulates the financial sector is the Financial Services Act 2012 (FSA). There are several Acts which comprise what is called financial services law, such as The Banking Act, 2010, the Insurance Act 2010 among others.[2] Under the FSA, “a person shall not operate, as a business, a financial institution unless the financial institution is licensed or registered and … complying with the terms of the licence.”[3]  The licence is issued by the Registrar. The reason why the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi, as a central bank, is mandated to supervise and regulate the financial sector is to avoid what is called systemic financial risk or contagion. The G-10 has defined systemic financial risk as:
risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy… In all but the most highly concentrated financial systems, systemic risk is normally associated with a contagious loss of value or confidence that spreads to parts of the financial system well beyond the original location of the precipitating shock. In a very highly concentrated financial system, on the other hand, the collapse of a single firm or market may be sufficient to qualify as a systemic event.[4]
And the reason why central banks are concerned with systemic risk is because the buck stops with them when there is trouble in the financial system. When a financial institution is in financial problems, or financial distress, it usually looks to the central bank for salvation. The central bank is not only the issuer of currency but also injects money into the financial system to stabilise it when the need arises. The technical term for this is liquidity. So when a financial institution has liquidity problems, the central bank needs to step in and avoid panic spreading within the financial system. Such panic can lead to contagion.
Padoa-Schioppa has provided a good rationale why central banks are involved in ensuring there is financial stability within the financial system:
A financial system may, and usually does, remain segmented to some extent. However, if a liquidity need emerges in a specific segment of it, it is always the central bank that bears ultimate responsibility. Hence, all the answers to why banking is a “system” have to do with the singleness of the currency and the central bank. This also shows that – with or without formal supervisory functions – the central bank is a key part of the financial system and responsible for its smooth functioning.[5]
This means the central bank really has no choice, it has to intervene whenever a financial institution is in problems because ultimately this will affect its liquidity needs. The problems may be corporate in nature including bad management or governance by the board. Just to make sure that we break this down, it is important to reiterate that the terms liquidity means money. Businesses need money to operate, it is as simple as that. And for the financial system, it is the money that oils its engine. The money may be in different forms (a subject outside the scope of this article) but this does not really matter. The money must be there otherwise the system collapses. Money does matter in finance. Under the law, the Registrar has power to act on troubled financial institutions including placing them under statutory management or in the worst case scenario, closure.
STATUTORY MANAGEMENT
In finance law, statutory management is a term of art. It is a technical term that refers to a situation when a regulator or supervisor (usually of the financial services appoints someone to run a business regulated under the financial services law.  In Malaŵi, when a prudentially regulated financial institution is placed under statutory management, the Registrar or any other person appointed by him shall be the statutory manager.[6] An insurer is under the law a prudentially regulated financial institution.[7] A discussion of regulation and prudential regulation is outside the scope of this article but the reader may wish to consult the Warwick Commission Report for a brief overview.[8] The law requires that once an institution is placed under statutory management, the public must be immediately informed.[9] This is essentially a safety measure; to safeguard the public from dealing with the troubles institution. Importantly, the statutory manager is in charge of management of affairs of the institution to the exclusion of the company’s directors and other managers.[10] Put simply the board and the management effectively become redundant once a statutory manager is appointed unless retained by the statutory manager. But this is not without prejudice to any claims they may have as employees.
Now why does the law provide for a statutory manager or management? In the first place it must be pointed out that the law is saying the previous managers and directors have failed to run the business according to the requirement of the financial services law and there is need for someone to come in. Placing an institution under statutory management usually means closure is not the only option on the table. The task of the statutory manager is to manage the affairs of the institution with the greatest economy possible compatible with efficiency and as soon as practicable report to the Registrar what steps need to be taken at the institution to correct things up or if not practicable whether to transfer the business or to wind it up.[11] It can therefore be inferred that although the law says the Registrar may be the statutory manager, the law does not really envisage this situation as it would lead to an absurdity, since the Registrar would effectively be reporting to himself. This in my view demonstrates that the drafters of this Act did not fully apply their mind to the functions of a statutory manager. But I digress.
The statutory manager is also not an independent manager in his/her own right as he/she has to comply with written directions from the Registrar in relation to his/her functions.[12] It is submitted that even where there is no express ban on new business as in this case, once a statutory manager has been appointed, the process will actually lead to clientele flight, lack of trust and most likely than not, liquidation or winding up of the business will be the end result. Appointment of a statutory manager usually is synonymous with the end of a business.
It is also important to point out that the statutory manager is paid by the company which has been placed under statutory management. This is an issue that has at times raised question about transparency of the process as well as fairness. After all the statutory manager cannot be paid less than he would normally receive in his daily job. Some financial commentators have argued that this in itself leads to a further squeeze on the company’s liquidity.
SO WHAT CAN WE EXPECT NEXT IN THE CASE OF PRIME?
The Registrar will appoint a statutory manager, most likely a tried and tested manager from within the central bank ranks. This person will run Prime Insurance and make an assessment to the Registrar whether the business can be saved as is, whether it needs to be restructured, broken up, sold or whether it should be wound up.
So far this is the third high profile case where a financial institution has been placed under statutory management. The first was Finance Bank.[13] Although business continued, there was clientele flight and liquidation was the result. The other was Citizen Insurance Company Limited (Citizen).[14] With Citizen the situation was similar to the one at Prime.  The company was essentially closed to new business and eventually also wound up. The reason for winding up was failure “to meet the minimum criteria as out in the Capital and Solvency Directive for general insurers.”[15] Furthermore the central bank rationalised that:
 [H]aving not diversified or penetrated the other insurance sector products, the effects of closing down Citizen Insurance are localized mainly in the Minibus motor subsectors. However, due to its size, and lack of complexity and systemic interconnectedness, it is envisaged that there will be no contagion effects on the other players in the market.[16]
The winding up of Citizen was a messy affair to all involved. In fact the central bank was even sued by its employees over lack of payment. The employees succeeded in the High court but were reversed in the Malaŵi Supreme Court of Appeal. I for one therefore would be most sceptical about Prime Insurance surviving the present arrangement. I just hope the situation will not be as messy. But I have a feeling of déjà vu. Why do I sound so pessimistic?
First the Registrar has implemented two regulatory tools all at once. He has placed the company under statutory management and also closed all new business. This sounds like a death knell to me. But the reason for doing this must be understood, lest I be misunderstood. The Registrar is under an obligation to protect the financial system as well as protect consumers. With the latter, the idea is that until a proper due diligence can be made about the viability of the business, no new consumers of insurance products should buy such products from the company. With regards to those who already have insurance contracts underwritten by the company, the Registrar has advised that these will remain valid.  Now here is where the issue of the buck stopping with the central bank comes in. For a start all financial institutions are required to have some capital adequacy reserves set by the central banks.  This is a measure of the “financial soundness” of an institution.  In the absence of a consumer insurance scheme administered by the central bank for consumers of financial products, these funds plus any accounts receivables would be available in the case of winding up, to pay creditors (including liquidating any assets). But this may not always be enough and in such a case creditors would be required to receive less, or take a hair-cut as is technically called.
Secondly the situation with Prime is somewhat similar to that of Citizen. At the time Citizen was being wound up, Prime was its competitor in the Minibuses insurance underwriting business. So one would say most of Citizen’s business eventually moved to Prime. I am also aware that for some time now, prime has been having serious liquidity problems.  It would seem that the same lack of diversification that Citizen faced applies to Prime. Ultimately when push comes to shove, I see the central bank using the same rationale:
Having not diversified or penetrated the other insurance sector products, the effects of closing down Prime Insurance will be localized mainly in the Minibus motor subsectors. However, due to its size, and lack of complexity and systemic interconnectedness, it is envisaged that there will be no contagion effects on the other players in the market.
LESSONS THAT CAN BE LEARNT FROM THIS
For the consumers of insurance products, this is a further squeeze.  Insurance products in Malaŵi are arguably not competitively priced to attract those in the lower echelons of society. Despite the insurance sector lamenting at the low insurance penetration in the country, the simple truth is that most Malaŵians cannot afford the premiums. They simply do not have the money. So this is a blow for those who found solace with insurance companies like Citizen and Prime.
For the insurance sector, it is quite clearly that not properly underwriting insurance liabilities of Minibus operators is suicidal. You can have a healthy stream of revenue but when the claims start pouring in, you will not be able to cope. So what is the alternative? Offer the insurance products at premium premiums.  This would not only mean the business is viable, but would also hopefully prompt help to restructure the minibuses operation business. For starters, it would mean it would sieve out those who are not prepared to adequately insure their fares as well as other road users who may come into collision with their buses. The downside is that it may shut out those who are struggling financially.
For the regulator, I would say I hope this is a wake-up call that things ought to be done with speed.   Any sensible person who has studied the insurance sector will testify that Citizen took too long to be placed under statutory management and the same goes with Prime. Prime has been struggling for almost a decade. Remedial actions should have been implemented then. Had this been done, there could have been hope of saving the business. I would say the entry of the Registrar at this late juncture is like a doctor coming in just to certify death.  This is evidence of regulatory failure. I deliberately use the phrase as I am aware that even within the central bank, the regulator was aware that prime was struggled. Although the latest Financial Stability Report (2014) indicates that the “insurance sector remained stable” the report did warn of the danger of “concentration in motor business for general insurance.”[17]  I would add that by this time the central bank was merely postponing the inevitable. However postponing the decision to place it under statutory management until now may ultimately mean Prime is on the way out.
So if you are an economist you will simply argue that Prime should get out of the business because they have demonstrated they cannot cope and that others will fill the void.  If you are a financial analyst you may wish to inquire further as to the reasons why Prime and similar sized companies have failed to make it in the insurance sector. If you are a social-activist you may ask what this means for the Malaŵian entrepreneur who attempts to enter the closed word of finance and for the Malaŵian consumer who may not afford the insurance products offered by the other insurers.



[1] Section 8(2), Financial Services Act, Act No. 26 of 2010, Malaŵi 2010) <https://www.rbm.mw/Home/GetContentFile/?ContentID=3743> accessed 3 June 2016
[2] Section 2, ibid
[3] Section 21(1)(a)(b) ibid
[4] G-10, 'Chapter III: Effects of consolidation on financial risk in Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector' (Group of 10, 2001), <https://www.imf.org/external/np/g10/2001/01/Eng/pdf/file3.pdf> accessed 1 June 2016, p126.
[5] Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, ‘Central Banks and Financial Stability: Exploring the Land in Between’ in Vitor Gaspar, Philipp Hartmann and Olaf Sleijpen (eds), Second ECB Central Banking Conference: The Transformation of the European Financial System (European Central Bank 2003), p274.
[6] Section 68(3), Financial Services Act, Malaŵi (2010)
[7] Section 2, ibid
[8] The Warwick Commission, 'The Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields' (University of Warwick, 2009), <https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/financialreform/report/uw_warcomm_intfinreform_09.pdf> accessed 2 June 2016
[9] Section 68(5), Financial Services Act, Malaŵi (2010)
[10] Section 69(2)(a), ibid
[11] Section 69(4), ibid
[12] Section 69(7), ibid
[13] Neil Nyirongo (then Deputy General Manager and later Executive Director of Economic Services at the central bank) was appointed Statutory Manager.
[14] (2011) Statutory Management of Citizen Insurance Company Limited (Reserve Bank of Malaŵi 2011)
[15] 'Financial Stability Report : December 2011 ' (Reserve Bank of Malaŵi, 2011 ), <file:///C:/Users/larmah/Downloads/FSR_DEC_2011_MAIN_EST%20DRAFT%20FEB%20%202012%20March%2013%20Launch%20edition.pdf> accessed 3 June 2016, p20.
[16] Ibid
[17] 'Financial Stability Report : December 2014' (Reserve Bank of Malaŵi, 2014), <file:///C:/Users/larmah/Downloads/FSR_DEC_2011_MAIN_EST%20DRAFT%20FEB%20%202012%20March%2013%20Launch%20edition.pdf> accessed 3 June 2016, p18.

Friday, 27 May 2016

Kenyan Judges clip President’s powers in choice of Chief Justice: Lessons for Malaŵi?

Sunduzwayo Madise
27 May 2016

Today’s Daily Nation of Kenya reports that the High Court had nullified powers given to the President “to pick a Chief Justice from a list of three nominees and send them to Parliament for approval.”[1] As a background, an amendment had been made to the Judicial Service Act[2] which gave the President the powers to select from one of three nominees.[3] ‘Prior to the amendments, the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) was mandated to submit only one name.’[4]

It is pertinent to point out at this stage to provide a brief overview of the law as it applies to appointment of Judges in Kenya, so that the discussion can be put in context. Interviews of Judges after floating out adverts are conducted in public and follow a thorough internal review, background check and vetting by the JSC before applicants are shortlisted.[5] Names of shortlisted applicant are made public in advance and the public is also notified when the interviews will take place as well as inviting the public to make submissions, if any, in relation to any of the candidates.[6] The law provides that “the Commission shall, within seven days of the conclusion of interviews, deliberate and nominate the most qualified applicants taking into account gender, regional, ethnic and other diversities of the people of Kenya.”[7] Furthermore, applicants are notified of the decision of the JSC even before the names are submitted to the President.[8] The names may also “be posted on the [JSC’s] website and placed in its press release.”[9] Once the JSC has made its decision, the names (now nominees) shall be submitted to the President and shall not be reconsidered by the JSC “except in the case of death, incapacity or withdrawal of a nominee”.[10] The process laid down by the law is thorough and transparent. It is also participatory.

This amendment to the Judicial Services Act was challenged in the Kenya High Court by the Law Society of Kenya and some members of the Judiciary. The High Court comprising a bench of five Justices ruled that “to the extent that the amendment compelled the JSC to send three names the said amendment is null and void”.[11] In their decision, the Justice opined, “the amendments, if allowed, will amount to taking the people of Kenya back to the old process of appointment by the President, which they discarded when they enacted the new Constitution.”[12] In emphasising the doctrines of constitutional supremacy and separation of powers, the Justices added “allowing the JSC to forward three names may result in horse trading and mischief, which the Constitution intended to safeguard.”[13]

In Constitutional Law and Constitutional Theory, the Constitution is supreme and trumps all laws. That is the essence of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. In the Kenyan Constitution[14], this is enshrined in Section 2. Section 2(4) invalidates any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution. Any amendment to it must be done according to the dictates of the Constitution itself.  Now unlike Malaŵi, in Kenya the Constitution was actually passed by a referendum of the people.[15] It means any changes (of substantive nature) would need a similar process. To reinforce this; the Kenyan Constitution holds that it is the people of Kenya who are sovereign.[16] So sovereignty is in and with the people but this sovereignty maybe delegated to the three arms of government; viz Executive, Legislature and Judiciary.[17] And relevant to this discussion is the provision that says any amendment relative to the judiciary and its offices shall be through a referendum.[18]

The essence of the ruling by the High Court is that allowing the changes would negative the doctrine of separation of powers. So ideally the Court is enshrining the independence of the three arms of government and ensuring that the Executive or indeed the Legislature is precluded from interfering with the other arm(s). Put in plain language then, what the Parliament in Kenya attempted to do was to amend the Constitution by amending a subsidiary Act of Parliament. In other words by using a prohibited backdoor route. This cannot do!

Now the article in the Daily Nation also refers to separate decision where the High Court held that it is mandatory that the President appoints all names submitted by the JSC. In other words, the law does not provide room for the President to manoeuvre, or as it is said in administrative circles, discretion. The Court is sending a strong message that this idea of the President ticking off names and cancelling others is really not on and does not promote judicial independence. In fact it can be argued that the President cannot profess to know the capabilities of nominees more than the JSC itself. That is where cronyism and other patrimonial considerations creep in and this erodes the independence of the judiciary. Bravo to the High Court in Kenya.

What lessons can Malaŵi learn from these two decisions which uphold the tenets of the Constitution and refuse to allow any attempts to interfere with the will and wishes of the people? Let us start by comparing the provisions that govern appointment of Judges in Kenya and Malaŵi.

Section 166(1) of the Kenya Constitution reads:
The President shall appoint— 
(a) the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, and subject to the approval of the National Assembly; and 
(b) all other judges, in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.

Section 111 of the Malaŵi Constitution[19] reads:
1. The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President and confirmed by the National Assembly by a majority of two thirds of the members present and voting. 
2. All other judges shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.

These sections with regards to appointment of Judges are almost the same or pari materia in legalese.[20] In other words, it would be wise to pay attention to how the Kenyan High Court has interpreted this provision as it is very similar to that obtaining in Malaŵi. It must be borne in mind, that the Malaŵi Constitution also has a section that invalidates any law inconsistent with the Constitution.[21] Furthermore, just like the Kenyan Constitution, the Malaŵian Constitution declares that it is supreme and binds everyone including all arms of Government.[22] So maybe we should not be surprised when the High Court in Malaŵi, if presented with a similar case, rules like their counterparts in Kenya. I recall that in the past, some nominees have sought to challenge appointments where the President seemed to have exercised his powers by leaving others out or at times only appointing a few judicial officers despite the high number of vacancies. If one reads both sections; in the Kenyan and Malaŵian Constitutions, it can be validly argued that once the recommendation has been made by the JSC, there is little room for the President to exercise discretion. Or put bluntly, there is no room at all. I guess that is the essence of the doctrine of separation of powers; otherwise we would be blowing both hot and cold.

The situation is different however with the appointment of the Chief Justice. In Kenya this follows the recommendation of the JSC. In Malaŵi this part is not in our law. Traditionally in Malaŵi the President has tended to appoint the most senior Judge as the Chief Justice. So far tradition has generally served us well. The only time this was deviated from related to the appointment of Chief Justice Munlo. However, there is nothing in the law that says a President cannot appoint a person from outside the bench. In the case of Chief Justice Munlo, he had served at the High Court previously as well as at an International tribunal. But to put it bluntly; there was dissatisfaction among some members of the bench, lawyers as well as members of the public. And in a way, it is due to the vagueness of the provision that such a situation arose. As things stand now, there is nothing stopping the President from appointing someone who has never even been on the bench as Chief Justice! The challenge maybe to get the nod of Parliament in confirming the person. There were worrying reports that with the current Chief Justice, CVs were requested from the senior Judges. Fortunately the most senior Judge was appointed and the day was saved. To avoid ‘horse trading and mischief, which the Constitution intended to safeguard’ it maybe necessary to have that provision in our Constitution clearly straightened out otherwise to leave it to the discretion of the President erodes the doctrine of separation of powers. The office of Chief Justice is one that needs the trust of the nation. It is submitted that while the President retains his power to appoint from outside, any such appointment runs the risk of alienating the appointee, among his or her peers as well as with regards to the public.

Another lesson that can be learnt from Kenya is the elaborate process of appointing judicial officers. This ensures transparency and accountability of and in the process. It also brings on board the public. In a way therefore, the public is forewarned as to who are likely to become its Judges once the shortlisted names are published as well as once the nominees have been decided. It would seem that despite adopting a new constitutional order in 1994, Malaŵi still have Acts of Parliament that are, to be it mildly, archaic. There is need therefore to ensure that all our laws align and are harmonised with the Constitution. It is only when this is done that the 1993 referendum can have real meaning. It may be a laborious process; but that is the cost of adopting a liberal constitution order.

Now as a final word, if one compares this to the recent case which involved the Clerk of Parliament,[23] that can be distinguished because the (manner of) appointment of the Clerk is not enshrined in the Constitution but delegated to subsidiary legislation. That said, the issue whether indeed the President retains discretion after a meritorious recommendation has been made with regard to the Clerk may have been decided by the Court but is still fertile ground for academic discourse. In Kenya the words recommended have been interpreted to mean it is mandatory. Indeed others may argue that the same would apply in Malaŵi. But it is important to emphasise that we are referring to different types of legislation (Constitution and Act of Parliament) and the principles of the interpretation may and indeed do differ.



[1] Abiud Ochieng ‘Judges clip President’s powers in choice of Chief Justice’ Daily Nation (Kenya) available at http://www.nation.co.ke/news/President-power-to-hire-Chief-Justice-quashed/-/1056/3220654/-/38n48kz/-/index.html accessed 27 May 2016.
[2] Judicial Service Act, No.1 of 2011 (Kenya) available at http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/Judicial_Service_Act_2011.pdf accessed 27 May 2016.
[3] Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 2015, No. 25 of 2015 (page 1770) available at http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/AmendmentActs/2015/StatuteLawMiscellaneousAmendmentAct2015.PDF accessed 27 May 2016.
[4] Abiud Ochieng (n1).
[5] First Schedule, Judicial Service Act (n2).
[6] Ibid, Art. 9.
[7] Ibid, Art. 14.
[8] Ibid, Art. 15
[9] Ibid, Art. 15(3)
[10] Ibid, Art. 16.
[11] Jillo Kadida ‘Court clips Uhuru’s powers to pick new CJ’ The Star (Kenya) available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/05/27/court-clips-uhurus-powers-to-pick-new-cj_c1358514 accessed 27 May 2016.
[12] Abiud Ochieng (n1)
[13] Ibid.
[14] The Constitution of Kenya [Rev. 2010] available at https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf accessed 27 may 2016
[15] Jeffrey gettleman ‘Kenyans Approve New Constitution’ The New York Times available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/world/africa/06kenya.html?_r=0 accessed 27 may 2016
[16] Section 1.
[17] Section 1(3).
[18] Section 255(1)(d)
[19] The Constitution of Malaŵi available at http://www.malawi.gov.mw/images/Publications/act/Constitution%20of%20Malawi.pdf accessed 27 may 2016.
[20] Laws pari materia must be construed with reference to each other – Adams et al v Day 14 LA. 503 (1840).
[21] Section 5.
[22] Section 4
[23] The State v The Attorney General, Ex parte Enock Chihana et al Miscellaneous Civil cause No. 86 of 2015 (High Court, Mzuzu).

Monday, 14 March 2016

TO RESIGN OR NOT TO RESIGN? THAT IS THE QUESTION

By Mfundisi
14 March 2016

Recently there have been media reports of several personalities and organisations asking President Peter Mutharika to resign. In response to this, Adamson Muula wrote an article in the Nation in which he validly, in my view, asks; “So the President resigns, what next?”[1]He goes on to ask how a purported government of national unity would be formed. This blog is a rejoinder to Muula’s article. It however, departs in that it discusses what the law says in response to these calls. Let me however, lest I be misunderstood, at the outset say what this post is about and what it is not. It is not about expressing a view on the presidency of Peter Mutharika from a political economy viewpoint. It is about looking at the legal propriety of calling for the resignation of a sitting President under our Constitutional dispensation.

The first think to distinguish between facts and law. Sometimes there is a morphing of the two; but sometimes there is a diversion. The terms de jure and de facto loosely mean according to law and as a matter of fact respectively. So let us take elections for example. When the statistics come out; everyone can see in fact who has won. This is the de facto winner. However it is the Electoral Commission that has to declare the winner according to law. This is the de jure winner. Most often than not the two are the same. Sometimes however, the de jure winner is not the person who appeared as the de facto winner in the first place. This happens where the EC is satisfied that the de facto winner did not validly win the election. Sometimes; this declaration has to be made ivy the court. In relation to a president, the person who is the de jure winner is the de facto President but not the de jure President. He only becomes the de jure President after the Chief Justice conducts the oath of office. At that time, the de facto morphs into the de jure. Now it is possible sometimes for the de facto to determine the de jure even against what would be considered the prevailing norms of a de jure society. A discussion of this is outside the scope of this post but the avid reader may be interested in the famous Southern Rhodesia case of Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke.[2]

Why I am I raising things that may seem obvious to most? It is to underscore the importance of always taking a moment to find out the position of the law regarding things. It may sometime require that we separate what we feel are the facts from the law. So let us come back to the issue of calls for the President to resign. What does the law say? Under our Constitution[3], once a President or Vice takes the oath of office, they hold office for a period of 5 years and continue to do so until a successor is sworn in[4]. In other words, the law provides for continuity in the presidency at all times. But this does not mean a President may not be removed from or leave office.  Under our Constitution, a vacancy in the office of president can only arise through the following means[5]

(a) Impeachment
(b) Incapacitation

Now interestingly the law does not provide for the death or resignation of the President. It does provide for the death and resignation of the Vice though.[6] Why this is not provided for is anyone guess. But one may have to revisit the time in which the Constitution was being negotiated to understand the dynamics. Does this mean that a sitting President cannot die or resign? Of course they can. Any mortal person will die sooner or later and as we saw with Bingu wa Mutharika, a sitting President can die. Death creates an automatic vacancy. So does resignation. However it would require that a President resigns on his own volition. However, this cannot be obtained by fraud, corruption or unlawful coercion. The same applies to the process of impeachment or incapacitation. The processes must be bona fide.

Therefore we can say a vacancy in the office of the President, or Vice President for that matter, arises due to:
(a)   Impeachment
(b) Incapacitation
(c)    Resignation 
(d) Death

Now suppose there is a vacancy in the office of the President, what happens? The law is also very clear, the Vice President shall assume that office for the remainder of the term and shall appoint another person to serve as Vice President.[7] However if both the office of the President and that of the Vice were to become vacant at the same time, then Cabinet shall elect among its members an Acting President and Acting Vice President who will hold office for 60 days or the remainder of the term if 4 years have elapsed.[8] If you recall at the death of Bingu wa Mutharika, there was an abortive motion by to declare that there was a simultaneous vacancy of both the President the Vice on the grounds that Joyce Banda had by forming her own party resigned. Suffice to say reason soon prevailed among all parties. But it was premised on this provision.

So let as apply the law to our facts. What would happen if Peter Mutharika for whatever decided to resign? Saulos Chilima would become President by operation of the law and would then appoint a Vice President. Can Peter Mutharika compel Saulos Chilima to resign as a ‘joint-package’? No, legally he cannot. Resignation at law is a personal thing. Put simply then, calls for Peter Mutharika to resign in our Constitutional order demonstrate a series lack of appreciation of the operation of the de jure government. Now some quarters, and Muula also cautions against this, have floated the idea of a government of national unity (GNU). Well it sounds a good term but the reality is our law does not provide for a GNU. It would require either a suspension or serious amendment of the Constitution. The first is a nonstarter and the latter is almost impossible to achieve in our polarised political setup. In fact it begs the question whether Parliament even has the power to make such a momentous change or whether it would require a referendum.

But this is not the first time we have heard of such calls. These calls were made when Bakili Muluzi became President. They were made when Bingu wa Mutharika became President. They were made when Joyce Banda became President. Reminiscent of the way Republicans hate Obama, some could not even stomach Joyce Banda’s tenure and called her Acting President.  Now we have some calls for Peter Mutharika to resign. But should anyone take these calls seriously? Politically, yes they should. Any politician worth his salt should take such calls seriously and evaluate their merits. But legally such calls are really amount to nothing with no consequences whatsoever. Therefore alleged deadlines given to the President to resign or step down are legally a nonstarter; a joke really.

Does this mean that people are not entitled to express their opinion on a sitting President including calling for him to resign or step down? They are surely so entitled. But it is important to realise that currently there is no constitutional crisis. Resignation by the President would not create a constitutional crisis because the Vice President would simply fill in. A vacancy in both the President and Vice would not create a Constitutional crisis either as Cabinet would simply appoint an Acting President and the Vice. Why anyone even bothers therefore to call for the President to resign is itself mind-boggling. But I guess it boils down to the golden phrase ‘freedom of expression.’

But why are we having these incessant calls to resign. To me it boils down to our bad political settlement in 1993. In my view, we should have adopted the 50%+1 majority then. Looking at the demographic spread of our country; this would force our polarised parties which truthfully speaking are mostly based on regional or ethnic lines to work together and garner enough support to carry the day. The winner-takes-all scenario we have now of first-past-the-post electoral system may seem good for any winner but immediately subjects such a winner to continuous pressure. Let me give an example to illustrate my point. Suppose you have 4 strong candidates in an election and they get the following votes:
·         Candidate A – 28%
·         Candidate B – 26%
·         Candidate C  - 24%
·         Candidate D – 22%

According to our first-past-the-post system, candidate A would be declared the de facto winner and upon being sworn the President de jure. In Gwanda Chakuamba v The Electoral Commission,[9] the Malawi Supreme Court ruled that majority simply means “greater than” for electoral purposes. Therefore the one who has a greater number of votes wins. Since we do not have proportional representation, it is a winner-takes-all scenario. It means technically a person can with the presidency in Malawi by 1 vote margin. They surely can win a parliamentary or ward counsellor seat by the same margin too. But look at the percentages again. This would mean the winner, candidate A has 70% of the population who did not vote for him. If these percentages are reflected in Parliament and if candidates B, C and D decide to form a coalition against candidate A, then clearly candidate A will have a torrid time. Now look at what happened in the last election[10].
·         Peter Mutharika (DPP) – 36.4%
·         Lazarus Chakwera (MCP) – 27.8%
·         Joyce Banda (PP) – 20.2%
·         Atupele Muluzi (UDF) –13.7%

You do not need to be a political scientist to realise that unless we change the political settlement; these problems will continue. It is a no brainer really. Now whatever maybe said about the DPP-UDF coalition, what it has done is to increase the numbers for Peter Mutharika to 50%. Unfortunately though; this seems not reflected in Parliament where the combined numbers of MCP and PP seem to be greater than the combined forces of DPP and UDF.  It is therefore the least surprising that the country is struggling in terms of a national agenda. The only solace is that Malawi is not a parliamentary system but rather one with an executive presidency. Were it not; the country would have been virtually at a standstill already. Until and unless we resolve the bad political settlement, I am afraid that we are pretty much stuck with what we have. Others may however argue that we have a de facto standstill or crisis. But do we have a de jure crisis?

In conclusion therefore, this post argues that calls for President Peter Mutharika to resign have no basis in law and the President can validly ignore them without breaching any of his lawful duties. So what is the point one may ask? I guess the answer lies in the phrase “it’s all politics”. In that vein, and that vein alone, the President maybe be right in saying ‘nilibe pulobulemu’.




[1] Adamson Muula ‘So the President resigns, what next?’ The Nation 28 February 2016 available at http://mwnation.com/so-the-president-resigns-what-next/
[2] [1968] 3 All ER 561 (PC). See also Herman  R Hahlo ‘The Pricy Council and the Gentle Revolution’ McGill Law Journal Vo. 16 92 available at http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/8409831-hahlo.pdf and Donald Molteno ‘The Rhodesian crisis and the Courts’ available at http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/journal_archive/00104051/1332.pdf
[3] Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (1994) available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/4953f2286ef1f7c2c1257129003696f4/$FILE/Constitution%20Malawi%20-%20EN.pdf
[4] Section 83(1)
[5] Section 86
[6] Section 84
[7] Section 83(4)
[8] Section 85
[9] Civil Appeal No. 20 of 2000 (MSCA) available at http://www.sdnp.org.mw/judiciary/civil/Chakuamba%20and%20Others%20v%20Attorney%20General%20and%20Others%20SC.htm
[10] ‘2014 Tripartite Election’ Malawi Electoral Commission available at http://www.mec.org.mw/pages/2014_Tripartite_Elections.html